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ROGERIO LOBATO is Minister for National Defence in the governm ent o f the 
Democratic Republic o f East Timor, and commander o f FALINTIL (East Timor 
National Liberation Forces).
He was sent out o f East Timor with three other Ministers, by his government, a few  
days before the full-scale Indonesian invasion on December 7, 1975 to carry out the 
important diplomatic struggle abroad and to seek support for the war against the 
Indonesian invaders.
Mr. Lobato has remained in constant contact with his governm ent in the liberated 
areas o f East Timor. His whole family, including his elder brother, Nicolau Lobato, 
Prime Minister o f the Democratic Republic o f  East Timor, remain inside East Timor.
In the past year Rogerio Lobato has visited many countries including China, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Mozambique and Angola, where he has also studied the 
liberation struggles o f these countries against imperialism.
As an officer in the Portuguese colonial army, Rogerio Lobato played a key role in 
rallying Timorese soldiers to defeat the reactionary coup attempt by the UDTgroup  
in August 1975. He also played an important role in containing the Indonesian 
invasion along the border with Indonesian Timor from September to Decem ber 1975.
This exclusive interview, made in Europe in January 1977, gives an excellent 
insight into the heroic struggle o f the East Timorese people against the invasion. 
What emerges quite clearly is that the struggle is not simply a spontaneous one, but 
one led by Fretilin, equipped with a clear concept o f the nature o f the struggle, o f a 
peop le ’s war, specifically adapted to the conditions o f East Timor.
lUMiElUO UMTO: 
HOW EAST TIMOR 
FIGHTS ON.
What is the military strategy Fretilin 
forces are following in East Timor?
Our strategy is defensive; we are not 
fighting a positional war. But as part of this 
strategy, we launch many small offensives, 
at the level of guerrilla attacks, or with a 
concentration of a large number o f troops.
For example, when the Indonesians 
advance with many troops, we avoid facing 
them directly, But whenever there is the 
opportunity of destroying a part o f this force, 
or of an ambush, we will attack. Through 
our intelligence service, we get information 
on the number o f troops operating in certain 
areas. Then, against smaller groups of the 
enemy, we will use very big concentrations of 
our forces to annihilate them.
Our strategy is to defeat and liquidate the 
enemy - not just defeat them, and have them 
run away to fight another day.
If for example the enemy advances with 
100 troops, we will attack with 500 and close 
all possibility for them to retreat and destroy 
them completely.
Similarly, if the enemy leaves a garrison of 
100 or 200 troops in a village or to protect the 
road, then it is good for us. We study carefully 
their situation and prepare very carefully a 
plan o f attack, using a force several times 
greater than theirs. We attack by surprise,
often at night, to win a short, sharp victory, 
to annihilate the enemy totally, and capture 
their war materials and medical supplies, 
before they can call reinforcements.
So, in general, the enemy is on the 
offensive, but we make small offensives 
within our defensive strategy.
Our strategy is that we want to destroy as 
many o f the enemy forces as possible and 
conserve our own forces. We therefore 
disperse our forces, but concentrate them to 
destroy the enemy and disperse them 
immediately after having carried out the 
attack.
Secondly, we seek to capture the maximum 
amount of war materials from the enemy, to 
conserve our own resources and to build a 
situation where we equal the enemy in 
numbers and military equipment. Then we 
will go to an offensive strategy, to inflict a 
final defeat on them.
We seek to kill as many enemy soldiers as 
possible, and minimise our own casualties. 
We seek to capture as many weapons and as 
much ammunition as possible, and use as 
little of our own stocks as possible.
Another factor in our strategy for a 
protracted war arises from our analysis of 
the enemy. In general, the enemy faces very 
big economic problems and so cannot face
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the perspective o f a long war against 
Fretilin. Our tactics are not only to kill as 
many enemy troops as possible, but also to 
destroy them economically.
So we must cut all the roads, destroy all the 
bridges and force the enemy to move by 
expensive means - helicopters, planes, 
warships.
Could you give some examples of how 
this strategy is applied?
On the road south o f M anatuto to 
Laklubar, we have destroyed the road at a 
mountain pass at Henuk.
On the south coast, where conditions are 
very bad for the enemy to move, even during 
the dry season, we have made it more 
impossible for them to move.
We have changed the courses o f rivers to 
flood the plains and stop tanks moving 
ahead. At the same time, we developed 
tactics to capture tanks - a technique used by 
the Vietnamese and Cambodians. We have 
captured some tanks and destroyed many 
tanks and armoured cars. Similarly, in 
fighting against helicopters we have also 
learnt many techniques used in Vietnam and 
Cambodia in their national liberation wars 
against American imperialism.
We take many days to prepare an ambush. 
We know the exact number of enemy forces. 
We mobilise the people in the area to go to 
there. Our plans are completely secret. Each 
soldier knows exactly his own tasks, what he 
must do, whom he must shoot and when. At 
every ambush, a well-trained commander is 
present.
For example, the enemy tried to go in a big 
convoy from Dili to Manatuto, along the 
main North coast road. We let them go as far 
as Subao, a very difficult part of the road 
which winds around a very steep cliff face, 
going straight into the sea. We planned the 
ambush - trenches were dug and each soldier 
given exact instructions. We shot the drivers 
o f the last and the first vehicles. The enemy 
was confused, whether to go forward or 
retreat, neither o f which were possible. We 
hit with the maximum force and surprise, 
with our troops as clase as 20 metres from the 
enemy. The enemy is very afraid o f fighting
at close hand because they cannot use their 
artillery. We completely destroyed that 
convoy. And since then the enemy has not 
tried to use that road.
In the many attacks on enemy camps, we 
follow a similar tactic. First we must take 
them by surprise in a well planned attack. 
The guards must be removed silently, then, 
with a very big force, we overwhelm the 
enemy in a short period, capturing their 
weapons and withdrawing immediately. 
Secondary forces on the roads stop 
reinforcements reaching the camp attacked.
And how do you estimate the enemy’s 
strategy in East Timor?
The Jakarta generals are seeking to divide 
East Timor into compartments - by cutting 
the territory from north to south and 
controlling the roads which cross the 
country. This can be seen by looking at a map 
o f East Timor and the areas penetrated by 
the enemy.
For instance, they landed at Dili, and went 
south down the road to Aileu and Maubisse. 
They landed at Betano, and went north to 
Same, to link up with their forces in 
Maubisse.
In achieving this strategy, they used as a 
tactic the deployment of a very big force, 
covered by bombing planes, warships and 
heavy artillery, and using tanks and 
armoured vehicles to move down these roads.
In face o f this massive attack, Fretilin 
retreats, but not passively. At some other 
time we will fight, ambushing the enemy, 
attacking smaller units.
The enemy hopes to stop Falintil moving 
freely throughout the territory. They want to 
bottle Fretilin forces in small areas. To do 
that garrisons o f one or two hundred are left 
along the road, and in smaller villages.
But that is good for Fretilin. We can 
concentrate three or four times the number of 
their garrisons and wipe them out in a well- 
prepared surprise attack, one by one.
That is why the Indonesian forces only 
control these roads theoretically. In practice, 
we can move freely throughout the territory. 
So the enemy strategy is a failure.
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They don’t go o ff the roads into the 
surrounding mountains. They only go where 
tanks can go. To climb the mountains is to be 
an easy target for Fretilin. It is very difficult 
for the Indonesians to fight in East Timor, 
because they don ’t know where Fretilin is - 
Fretilin is everywhere. Moreover, the 
Indonesians are fighting in a strange 
country - they don’t know the terrain.
How are Fretilin forces organised?
The Fretilin forces are divided into four 
sections.
First there is the regular army, made up of 
all Timorese troops that were in the 
Portuguese colonial army and all Timorese 
who had already done military service and 
were in the reserves. These troops are very 
mobile and have the task o f fighting all over 
the country - from the border to Tutuala. 
They are the troops who can concentrate for 
a large scale attack and then disperse to 
conserve our forces.
Second, there are the regional troops 
which operate only in a certain region, for 
example, from Baucau to Viqueque. When 
attacks are made, the regional troops 
coordinate with the regular troops.
Third are the guerrillas. Mainly composed 
o f militia they operate in very small areas 
and are very widespread. They coordinate 
with the regular and regional troops for 
attacks.
And finally there are the self-defence 
forces, composed o f a big majority o f  the 
people. They fight with everything useful to 
kill the enemy. They rely mainly on 
traditional weapons - bows and arrows, 
blowpipes, traps. They also combine with the 
regular, regional and guerrilla forces for 
actions.
That is why the war we are fighting in East 
Timor is a people’s war - all the people are 
engaged in the struggle, but with different 
tasks both militarily and on other fronts.
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And one o f those other fronts is to 
produce food?
Yes, that’s a very important front in the 
struggle. And it’s not just a task for the 
people but for the army too. Together, the 
people and Falintil work together to produce 
all they need to eat, to maintain the struggle.
Every m ilitary unit has its own  
gardens. How do the soldiers fight and 
yet maintain their gardens?
It is very simple. They must create 
conditions where they have the possibility of 
a break from fighting to work in the gardens, 
to feed themselves. The gardens are very far 
from Indonesian-controlled areas where it is 
difficult for the enemy to infiltrate.
Not only has there been a very big increase 
in the area of rice fields, but we have also 
begun agriculture in the forests.
When a unit is, say, operating from a forest 
for one or two weeks, they plant all they need
- tapioca, sweet potatoes, marrows, etc. When 
they return in a month or so, they find there a 
store of crops to feed themselves. Moreover, 
there is plenty of wild game in the forests - 
wild deer, buffalo, cassowaries etc. Our 
people know very well how to hunt such 
game with traditional weapons - there is no 
need to use ammunition.
Not only are we growing more food, but we 
are also trying to improve the nutrition o f the 
people, to give them better, more varied food 
than they have had in the past.
We also encourage people living in one 
village to learn from one another. For 
example, there is one village in East Timor 
where they have a highly developed system 
of firing arrows on an artillery basis which 
fall in a rain o f arrows on the head and body 
of a wild animal. It is a system used for 
hundreds o f years. Now, not only is that 
village using this system to catch game, but 
also to fight the enemy. - and they are 
teaching it to other villages. Previously they 
kept it a closely guarded secret.
Nevertheless, many people in Australia 
think that the people of East Timor must 
be starving...
In colonial times in East Timor, even with 
the terrible exploitation o f the people by the
Portuguese colonialists, there was never 
starvation in the country. No one has died of 
hunger for hundreds o f years. When the 
Portuguese said the people were hungry, they 
meant they had no protein in their diet. In 
fact, the people always had enough food to 
eat, but not good enough in quality - in 
protein and nutritional value.
Today, as I said, Fretilin is trying to solve 
that problem too.
In the forests there are traditional foods. 
For instance, wild beans grow in plenty, but 
they have to be cooked six or seven times to 
get rid o f the poison. The people gathered 
them in times when there was not enough 
rice or corn. There are sago palms and wild 
leaves that can be eaten, and have been for 
hundreds of years.
When people in Australia say that, maybe 
they are thinking about living standards in 
Australia.
You must understand that, under 
Portuguese colonialism, the people were 
divided; they were discouraged from working 
in groups or collectively.
Now, led by Fretilin, they have formed 
cooperatives throughout the country, and 
work collectively, to support each other very 
tightly. Now they can grow more food 
together than they ever could individually. 
You must remember, too, that we have many 
types o f corn and rice, including rice that 
grows in the mountains.
How do the people cope with attempts 
by the enemy to destroy food crops and 
supplies?
The enemy cannot go by foot into the 
liberated areas, so they try to destroy crops 
by bombing.
But the people are mobilised. They find 
ways to continue production even under 
bombing. We have theexamples o f Vietnam , 
Laos and Kampuchea where the people grew 
enough to eat to fight a thirty year struggle 
un der very  h e a v y  b o m b in g . The 
Indonesians do not have the potential to 
match the US airforce and cover East Timor 
with bombs.
It is the policy o f the Indonesians to kill, 
burn and destroy everything in East Timor.
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This has been their strategy, is now their 
strategy and will continue to be their 
strategy.
They do this in the hope that they will 
destroy the people’s possibility to resist. But 
when they burn and destroy everything in 
the areas they control, they are also in 
difficulties, because they too must eat. They 
are used to everything - beef, beer, good 
houses. So when they destroy everything 
around them, they face starvation.
But our army and people live in the forests. 
We are used to living, after 400 years of 
Portuguese colonialism, in bad conditions, 
and we can adapt.
So the enemy are in villages surrounded 
by burnt out fields, under constant attack 
going hungry. They begin to fight each other, 
disobey their officers and want to get back 
home. Above all they refuse to go into the 
forests.
Our strategy of never defending positions 
against large forces, and o f concentrating 
our efforts on destroying enemy forces, of 
killing their human forces, increases this 
demoralisation.
What is the relationsh ip  betw een  
Falintil and the Fretilin  Central 
Committee?
Falintil are the armed forces o f the people 
o f East Timor under the direct command of 
the Fretilin Central Committee. Senior 
commanders of Falintil are members o f the 
Fretilin Central Committee.
It is therefore under the leadership of 
Fretilin and follows the political line of 
Fretilin, as the armed wing o f the people of 
East Timor.
I want to stress thatin the army, politics is, 
and always will be, supreme.
In all Falintil forces, we have political 
commissioners. Each military unit, down to 
a group o f thirty fighters, has a political 
commissioner. He fights in the war, but his 
main task is to lead the soldiers to follow the 
correct m ilitary and politica l line. 
Ideological education takes place in all 
military units, particularly concerning the 
correct way for fighters to deal with the 
people. When, for example, guerrillas arrive 
at a farm and are very hungry, they must
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never simply take food, but must ask the 
people for it. And if the fighters have food 
and the people are hungry they must share 
their food with them. If the people are sick, 
they must help them as much as possible.
Another important question for political 
commissioners to explain is a correct attitude 
to Indonesian soldiers. Of course, the 
invading forces have committed terrible 
atrocities and it is not easy for the people and 
soldiers to have a correct position on this 
question. At the beginning, the people killed 
many o f the Indonesian soldiers who were 
captured.
But the position o f the Fretilin Central 
Committee is very clear on this question. We 
have to re-educate the Indonesian soldiers on 
the aims o f Indonesian colonial aggression. 
We have to tell them to turn their guns not 
against the people of East Timor, who are 
their brothers and sisters, but against the 
Suharto clique, who are also exploiting the 
Indonesian people.
So, our political commissioners teach the 
people and army to behave like revolutionary 
soldiers towards the enemy soldiers.
Are you in a position to tell us how many 
Indonesian soldiers are prisoners of 
war in the liberated areas?
Yes. There are hundreds o f Indonesian 
prisoners throughout East Timor. Many are 
in re-educationc camps, including many 
officers. Few o f our people speak Bahasa 
Indonesia, so we get those prisoners who 
speak English to teach some o f our people 
Bahasa.
And what of the ex-UDT and ex- 
A P O D E T I  w h o  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  
Indonesian invasion? What role are 
these puppets playing in the war?
The puppets in Dili are powerless. They are 
not armed because the Indonesian generals 
don’t trust them any more. They are noteven 
in the police force in Dili. Only Indonesians 
are allowed to carry arms.
Many people captured by the Indonesians 
have escaped from the terrible conditions in 
the concentration camps the enemy set up. 
They have been welcomed back, and joined 
the fight.
But the puppets are afraid to return to the 
liberated areas. Not because o f the attitude of 
the Fretilin Central Committee, but because 
o f the hatred o f the people for those, who 
have contributed so much to the present 
conditions in East Timor. But Fretilin policy 
is that all people can be re-educated and re­
habilitated, and we want the puppets to leave 
Dili and join us in the mountains. In fact, we 
teach the people to accept this principle, not 
to kill them, but to liberate everyone.
Of course, the top puppets, those most 
responsible for the presentsituation,mustbe 
judged by the people themselves who must 
decide their sentence.
We are fighting for a society in which the 
people make the decisions. We don ’t want to 
be authoritarian. The people have the right 
to speak and say what they think.
What is the proportion of territory and 
of the population now living in the 
liberated areas?
In East Timor, it is a people’s war, so we 
need people to fight. We do everything we can 
to have as many people as possible in the 
liberated areas. This was a strategy we 
followed even before the fullscale invasion.
About 90 percent o f the population are in 
the liberated areas. The rest are under 
Indonesian control, in very bad conditions in 
concentration  cam ps, w here they are 
starving, subject to rape and all sorts of 
humiliation and to summary execution. The 
people in these camps try to escape and join 
the liberated areas. Fretilin forces do 
everything possible to help them get away.
Earlier, when we were speaking about 
whether people were starving in the liberated 
areas, I should have stressed that the ones 
really starving are those who are prisoners of 
the Indonesians. They are forbidden to go 
into the forests to gather food because the 
Indonesians fear they will join Fretilin. 
Anyone trying to go to the forests runs the 
risk o f being shot by the enemy.
Fretilin forces have launched many 
attacks to liberate the captured population 
and thousands have already been liberated.
Our strategy is to eventually reach a 
situation where the Indonesians are alone in 
the areas they control and literally the whole
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population is in the liberated areas fighting a 
people’s war against the invaders.
Fretilin today controls over 85 percent of 
the territory. And the remaining 15 percent 
or less controlled by the enemy includes the 
enclave o f Oe-Cussi and the small island of 
A tauro, w hich  are com plete ly  under 
Indonesian control.
The Indonesians control some towns like 
Dili, Baucau, Maubisse, Aileu, etc. But even 
in these towns they are under constant 
attack. The enemy is forced to concentrate 
their troops to protect these towns, and the 
enemy soldiers want to stay there, not fight, 
but spend their time in the towns.
The Indonesian troops only spend a 
certain time in East Timor - six months, then 
go back home, to be replaced by fresh troops. 
O f course, the ordinary Indonesian soldier 
doesn’t want to risk being killed in those six 
months. They therefore avoid fighting as 
much as possible, wanting to return to 
Indonesia as heroes, rather than for burial.
The Indonesian generals sit in Jakarta or 
even Dili, make their plans on maps and 
order their soldiers to fight to carry them out.
But the Indonesian  sold iers are now  
realising, after suffering very big casualties, 
that they cannot win the war. They just want 
to live and go home.
The links between the Indonesian soldiers 
and their officers are those peculiar to a 
fascist arm y. The sold iers are kept 
completely apart from their officers. The 
senior officers stay in Dili and Baucau. 
There, the officers spend most of their time 
o r g a n is in g  b u s in e s s e s s  - b a rs  and  
restaurants etc. - and encourage the ordinary 
soldiers to spend their money there instead of 
sending it to their families. And so the 
officers make a lot o f  money from corruption.
So the ordinary Indonesian soldier can see 
he is being asked to die to defend the 
Indonesian generals who are making big 
money in Dili and Baucau while they are 
fighting in the mountains.
They know their families and relatives are 
starving in Indonesia. The soldier is one of 
the most privileged in a village in relation to 
others, so he is expected to keep an extended 
family - not only his immediate family, but 
relations. Who feeds these people if  the 
soldier dies in East Timor?
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The more Indonesian soliders are sent to 
East Timor, the more will be the discontent in 
Indonesia.
The enemy can ’t move by roads so much 
transportation is by sea or by air.
How do you see the situation developing 
in the coming months?
It is better for Fretilin in the present wet 
season.
It is difficult for the enemy to move because 
he relies on tanks and armoured vehicles 
which are difficult to move on the roads and 
across the flooded rivers. So Fretilin is in a 
better position to attack. In the wet season 
too, we can recover our strength, heal the 
wounded, and tend the crops. I hope Fretilin 
will be able in the coming months, to recover 
some o f the villages the Indonesians have 
taken. It is logical that we will be able to do 
that as in the last dry season we took back 
many villages. We expected a big offensive 
by the enemy in the last dry season, but we 
launched one instead. That demoralised 
many Indonesian soldiers.
I am sure the present wet season will 
completely change things. We are in a good 
position to attack, because we don’t rely on 
tanks. We move on horseback or by foot.
The enemy finds it very difficult in the wet 
season, when it rains for weeks on end. We 
are used to it ...
Turning to the question of health: there 
are no doctors in the liberated areas 
now. Many people in Australia wonder 
how you can survive?
Actually, there may be an Indian doctor 
still in the liberated area, but I am not sure if 
he is still alive...
But there are many highly trained and 
experienced nurses who are working hard to 
support the struggle and train “ barefoot 
doctors” to try to solve the problems o f 
looking after the wounded and sick. We have 
many problems to resolve after this war and 
our nurses will be competent to solve many of 
them.
We are using traditional medicines. East 
Timor has a very highly developed system of 
traditional medicine. According to custom, 
all this traditional medical knowledge was
passed on by the traditional doctor to his 
eldest son. He held a strong position in the 
village and traditional structure. Now 
Fretilin has been able to persuade the 
traditional doctors to share their knowledge 
with the whole people. Some o f them are still 
conservative, but many others have joined in 
the campaign through the appeal made by 
Fretilin Central C om m ittee, and are 
teaching all the young people traditional 
medicine.
For hundreds o f years these traditional 
medicines, prepared from herbs, barks and 
roots etc... have been used to cure malaria 
and other diseases and infections and heal 
broken lim bs. There are trad itional 
medicines, for example, which can be very 
successfully used as anaesthetics to enable 
operations on wounded soldiers.
Many of the herbs I have seen used in 
traditional medicines in China, for example, 
are similar to those used in East Timor.
You know that under Portuguese 
colonialism, there were never enough doctors 
and nurses. People had to solve medical 
problems with traditional medicines, and 
that knowledge has remained intact.
Is the a n t i - i l l i t e r a c y  c a m p a i g n  
continuing under wrar conditions?
The anti-illiteracy campaign has been 
intensified in the past year. It is clearly 
important, even from a military point of 
view, that people can read and write. But it is 
also important that they can explain and 
understand Fretilin ideology. Over 50,000 
people are now in the anti-illiteracy courses - 
not just children, but all ages. The anti­
illiteracy campaign is also continuing inside 
Falintil.
The Political Bureau o f the Fretilin Central 
Committee is in charge of the anti-illiteracy 
campaign and everywhere the people are 
mobilised to take part in it. It is not simply 
anti-illiteracy, but also political education - 
about the nature o f Indonesian aggression 
etc. Most primary school teachers escaped 
the invasion and are now in Fretilin’s ranks. 
They form the basis for this campaign.
In addition, we are reviving our traditional 
culture - songs, dances, etc. - and, in general, 
to think our own way, not in the way the 
colonialists taught us.
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We also have to revive many traditional 
means of expression - traditional oratory, 
which contained a rich history of our people, 
o f oppression  and resistan ce . These 
speeches, learnt by heart,by the orators, are 
the basis for our future literature. Many old 
men and their knowledge may die in this war 
but we must preserve their knowledge - they 
are living libraries.
But, in addition, while preserving our 
culture, we must introduce new things, and 
also learn from the people. Those who have 
been to agriculture college know many 
things, but how to apply them and how to 
adapt them can only be learnt through 
working with the people.
What is the situation now in West 
Timor?
Fretilin respects the integrity o f the 
Indonesian Republic. But, o f course, when 
the Indonesians attack us, we can also
counter-attack. The larger areas we can fight 
in, the better for us. So we will help all 
movements against Suharto, and we will 
help the liberation movement in West Timor 
too. We are not expansionist, like Suharto, 
and when the other side (in West Timor) is 
liberated, they will be Indonesians. We want 
to help them in all ways.
Suharto is trying to extinguish the fire in 
East Timor, but in fact he is pouring oil on 
the fire. Not only in East Timor, but also in 
West Timor. We will help them until the 
complete defeat o f Suharto.
The next leader o f Indonesia must pay 
attention to the problem o f East Timor.
We will never surrender to Suharto, or any 
other leaders o f Indonesia, we will fight them 
and help all movements fighting them.
In West Timor, we know through refugees 
and from other sources, that there are over 
1000 West Timorese guerrillas fighting there, 
helped by Fretilin.
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